Carlos Ghosn Nissan Ceo

Carlos Ghosn as CEO of Nissan and Renault: Can He Rework the ‘Nissan Magic'? â€Å"We knew some people were concerned about the potential for culture clashes, between the French and the Japanese, but it was not an issue. Cultural differences should be used as a catalyst for change, not as a crutch that inhibits change. You can learn a lot from somebody who is not like you. â€Å"1 – Carlos Ghosn, CEO, Nissan. â€Å"Make sure you are focused on your own people. Bring in them motivation and sense of ownership, then you can do your miracle. 2 – Carlos Ghosn, CEO, Nissan. Introduction In 2002, Louis Schweitzer, CEO of Renault announced that Carlos Ghosn, the president and CEO of Nissan would also take over the reigns at Renault in April 2005, while Schweitzer would remain the chairman of the board. With the new position , Carlos Ghosn would lead two companies Nissan and Renault. As of 2004,Renault held 44%stake in Nissan and Nissan owned around 15%of Renault's shar es. ‘Turnaround artist', as Carlos Ghosn was called was behind the industry's most remarkable turnaround at Nissan.After he became the CEO of Nissan in 1999, he had brought in many un-Japanese changes in the Japanese company and had actively persuaded the employees to accept change. Carlos Ghosn was credited for reviving the company from$254million losses and $19billion debt in 1999 into profits within two years. After taking up his position as the CEO of Renault in April 2005,CarlosGhosn is likely to face many challenges. Heading two different automobile companies from two different countries was first of its kind and industry observers expressed doubts whether Ghosn would be able to take up the pressure and rework the ‘Nissanmagic'.Carlos Ghosn: The ‘Nissan Magic'In March 1999,Renault, the then ninth carmaker in the world announced its alliance with Nissan investing $5. 4 billion. Nissan was in losses for many years from 1990-1999 except for profits reported in 1 997(Annexure I) and looked out for partners to recover from the troubles. The brand recognition was very low and it was estimated that Nissan was losing $1000 for every car it sold in US. By the end of 1990s,Nissan exported cars to Europe and Australia and some parts of Asia. The company was in losses to the tune of $5. billion, had debts totaling around $19 billion and was suffering from a poor product portfolio and diminishing brand value. Nissan’s market share had dropped from 6. 6 %in 1991 to 4. 9%by late 1990s. Renault at the same time was expanding internationally through acquisitions. After the unsuccessful merger with Volvo, Renault under Louis Schweitzer entered into an alliance with Nissan acquiring a 36%stake in the company. Triggering the alliance was Nissan’s strength in product designs and sophisticated manufacturing that blended well with the engineering quality at Renault.For Renault, the alliance would help in international expansions in the long-term while for Nissan; it was to get rid of its short-term troubles that had accumulated. Initially industry observers were skeptical about a non-Japanese manager successfully leading a Japanese firm. While Carlos Ghosn was successful in cutting costs and had sometimes imposed hard regimes during his tenure atMichelin3  , many were apprehensive if he would be successful in Japan. | | He was 46 when he joined Nissan and was far younger than the middle-level managers in the company.Carlos Ghosn knew nothing about Japan and had no knowledge of the culture there. He once said that he had a ‘very vague' idea about the country and accepted, â€Å"I did not try to learn too much about Japan before coming, because I didn’t want to have too many preconceived ideas. I wanted to discover Japan by being in Japan with Japanese people. â€Å"4  On the first day, when Carlos Ghosn arrived at Nissan, he took an elevator to reach his office. As he entered the lift, which was already pa cked with workers who were coming up from garage, everyone knew he was the new CEO. To his surprise, at every floor the lift stopped, none got down.Finally, when he got down, the employees bowed as he left and went back to their floors. After such an unexpected incident, which reflected major cultural difference, Carlos Ghosn realized how important it was to understand them. Since the first day, Carlos Ghosn had made the cultural diversity a catalyst rather than a crutch for the company. 5 Next >> 1]Carlos Ghosn's interview, â€Å"Interview: The road to ruin†, www. themanufacturer. com, December 2002 2]Parachkevova, Anna â€Å"CEO outlines Nissan’s resurgence†, www. thedartmouth. com, May 12th 2004 3]Carlos Ghosn joined Michelin in 1974, where he was chairman and CEO ofNorth American operations and had undertook several cost cutting initiatives. 4]†Carlos Ghosn: standing at the global crossing†, http://web-japan. org, April 5th 2002 5]†Th rowing away the culture crutch†, 2000 Automotive News World Congress, January 18th 2000 Carlos Ghosn: The ‘Nissan Magic' Cont†¦ However, since the beginning, Carlos Ghosn was in a Catch-22 situation as Japanese were not used to dictatorship kind of leadership. He knew that if he tried to dictate terms, that could lead to bruising employee morale, and if he remained lenient, it could hinder the required change.Instead of imposing change ,CarlosGhosn brought about the need for urgency in operations by mobilizing   them an agers. Carlos Ghosn identified that the basic flaw with Nissan’s culture when he took over was that employees were reluctant to accept the failures and held other departments or economic conditions responsible for them. This resulted in a lack of urgency among employees as everyone assumed the other would take action. He found that instead of solving the problems, they were trying to live with them.Nissan throughout 1990s, had been concentra ting on short-termmarket share growth rather than long termgrowth and instead of investing its profits towards product portfolio improvement itwas spending themtowards equity purchases of other companies especially its suppliers. Its product profile was comparatively outdated with old designs when customers craved for stylish designs while competitors were steadily focusing on new product designs. By 1999, it had around $4 billion held in the form of shares while its purchasing costs remained very high, around 20-25%more than that of Renault's.The employees openly resisted cross-functional teams, as they strongly believed in territories and sectionalism, which was a major part of their culture. Carlos Ghosn explained, â€Å"Engineers work very well together, financial people work very well together, salespeople work very well together. But when you start to add an engineer, a marketer, a salesperson, and a manufacturer, here all the strengths of Japan in teamwork disappear. â€Å" 6  To overcome the resistance, he had to explain to the employees why the cross-functional teams were important and how they would impact the overall benefits.Carlos Ghosn believed that the general human tendency was to resist anything different. He considered that by accepting change, people tend to become stronger, as they understand the differences and try to analyze the causes for such differences. Cross-functional teams were formed and employees were involved in the revival process. This helped Carlos Ghosn explain his plans and gain acceptance easily. Through these cross-functional teams, employees were made to look beyond their line of responsibilities, understanding the nitty- gritties of the other departments as well.After the cross-functional teams were in place, people owned up responsibility whenever something went wrong. â€Å"The solution to Nissan’s problems was inside the company. The main [idea] we would have for revival of the company would be a rebuilt m otivation of Nissan employees and partners,† he explained. 7| | Immediately after appointing the teams, they were asked to submit plans to achieve the maximum possible output in each area and within a week decisions were made. The outcome was the Nissan Revival Plan (NRP).After the NRPwas announced, every aspect from the timing, the plan schedules and the commitments as well as targets were clearly stated. Shiro Tomii, vice president, Nissan Japan remarked, â€Å"He establishes high yet attainable goals; makes everything clear to all roles and levels of responsibility, works with speed; checks on progress; and appraises results based on fact. â€Å"8 Next >> 6]†Carlos Ghosn: standing at the global crossing†, op. cit 7]Saadi, Dania â€Å"Nissan's miracle man offers clues to solving national economic woes†, www. lebanonwire. com   8]David Magee, Turnaround: how Carlos Ghosn rescued NissanCarlos Ghosn: The ‘Nissan Magic' Cont†¦ Listening to the employees and facilitating their participation in the decision-making process, was key aspect of Carlos Ghosn's leadership. By avoiding impersonal meetings through mails, he stressed the need for face-to-face communication. He believed that the people close to the company could come out with better solutions than an outsider like him. In contrast, the Japanese were polite, reticent and never spoke about the plans to their boss. Carlos Ghosn had to repeatedly explain to the employees that he needed their viewpoints and would not mind if they speak out.This, according to him was the greatest hurdle. While in France at Renault, he emphasized on teamwork, in Japan he believed it was not required and instead individuality was given more prominence. Price Water house Coopers in a report on change management listed Carlos Ghosn's key human resource management techniques calling them very simple and straightforward By maintaining transparency from the stage of planning to action, he ai med at the best possible out comes while also lifting the morale of the employees who were particularly distressed after the crisis at the company.He invited suggestions from every influential individual from suppliers, Nissan’s ex-employees, dealers etc. He explained, â€Å"As you know credibility has two legs, performance, and transparency. Performance, we had none to show at the time, so we were determined to be highly transparent. â€Å"9  He called the NRP, an ‘organization's collective effort' involving thousands of employees at every managerial level. To show his commitment to the plan, he declared that he would resign along with other top executives if the plan fails in bringing in the benefits. Carlos Ghosn wanted immediate results by fixing short-term targets.While he called the passive style of management-by-consensus a killer, an active and constructional version could work miracles, according to him. He believed that an 85%consensus was enough and 100%w as not always essential. While cultural adaptability had been his key, he was also at the same time affirmative about giving more priority to the bottom-line growth rather than just to the cultural aspects. He remarked, â€Å"I do not want to intentionally offend people, but I am more concerned about making Nissan profitable again than being culturally sensitive. â€Å"10| | The first phase of NRP focused on cutting the costs and improving profits.The first major step Carlos Ghosn undertook was divestments from subsidiaries to reduce the debt. Suppliers accounted for major part of costs of production and the age-old Keiretsu system and the obligations that came with it were adding to heavy costs11  . Deviating from the system, Carlos Ghosn opened the purchasing offer to all the suppliers encouraging new suppliers who were ready to supply at low prices. As part of the revival plan, suppliers were forced to offer discounts to the tune of 20-30%and the number of suppliers was broug ht down to 600 from 1145 while the purchasing costs were reduced by 20%.During a meeting with the dealers of Nissan, Carlos Ghosn announced, â€Å"I don't want any excuses. I want to know what you are going to do to make things better. â€Å"12  Cost cutting at each stage began to be regarded as the need of the hour as the employees were encouraged to reduce expenses through all possible ways. The cross functional teams were given one month time to identify areas to cut costs and increase the profits through bottom-line growth. Next >> 9]Ibid. 10]Larimar, Tim â€Å"Japan, Nissan and Ghosn revolution†, www. sb. columbia. edu 11]The Keiretsu system, in which the companies maintained partnership with each of its suppliers, holding shares in those companies, transferring managers characterized the big family of companies and its suppliers were both shared relationships 12]Larimar, Tim â€Å"Japan, Nissan and Ghosn revolution†, op. cit. Carlos Ghosn: The ‘Ni ssan Magic' Cont†¦ The most un-Japanese practices like closing plants and cutting work force, in a country, which believed in lifetime employment, were the biggest of all challenges.When he planned to close five plants which included both assembly plants and power train plants, the board of directors were not informed until the night before, as Carlos Ghosn knew some people within the company wanted his plans to fail. After he announced, he was reported to have threatened, â€Å"If this leaks out, I'll close seven plants, not five. â€Å"13  For Carlos Ghosn, convincing the labor unions over the disadvantages of rigid job definition was a big task. The seniority-based promotion that was entrenched in the Japanese firm was replaced by a performance based and merit-based incentive system.Instead of sacking people, which was against the culture in Japan, 21,000 jobs were cut through retirements, pre-retirements and golden handshakes out of which 16500 were in Japan alone. The plants were closed, while offering alternative jobs to the employees in other plants of the company. The complex manufacturing structure, which involved 24 platforms at seven assembly plants, was brought down to 12 platforms, which were shared by four plants. Around 10%of the retail outlets were closed and 20%of the dealer affiliates was streamlined to further reduce selling and marketing expenses.After the phase one of the revival plan was over, Nissan reported profits of $1. 5 billion for six months between April to September, which was the best results the company had ever seen. At the same time, Carlos Ghosn began to be called an iconoclast, who had brought in some un-Japanese, western style of culture in the company’s operations. He, in contrast to the traditional Japanese business etiquettes, shook hands with his partners and other executives. As a result, there was discontent among the traditionalists and other industry associations in the country.And his bold decision s like closing plants, had invited repugnance among many including the insiders and Ghosn began to take along a bodyguard wherever he went| | The cross-cultural merger between a French and a Japanese firm, raised several other challenges. The alliance aimed at cost savings through sharing of platforms and engineering capabilities. Initially though the employees and the design engineers were convinced over the superiority of the platforms brought in from the Renault plants, they were reluctant to adopt them.To overcome resistance, regular meetings were conducted among the Nissan and Renault employees. While at the same time, Carlos Ghosn began to recruit more designers from Japan to design new models. He maintained that the best way to solve the cultural differences was to avoid forcing the cultural blend. Rather, he believed in appreciating the differences between the cultures and minimizing the cultural clashes by bringing in a performance-driven management. To ensure that the Japa nese staff understands what the French managers spoke, English was made the common language in the company.A dictionary of 100 key words used by them management was prepared to solve the differences in the way each work was interpreted by French as well as Japanese. The words included ‘commitment', ‘transparency', ‘objectives', and ‘targets' etc. Carlos Ghosn: The ‘Nissan Magic' Cont†¦ In Japan, attending all formal parties of suppliers was very important and one was not supposed to miss them unless there was a strong reason. When Carlos Ghosn missed the New Year Party hosted by the suppliers’ association, it was considered as a sign of disrespect to their culture.Carlos Ghosn had attended all such gatherings since then. Carlo sGhosn understood all these subtle aspects, which were an essential part of the culture, as he began adapting to them. In the second phase of the revival plan, which started in 2001, Carlos Ghosn stressed on selling mo re cars, improving the top line growth as well. Dropping non-performing products from its portfolio, the company introduced trendy new models in SUVs and minivans category. An updated Z sports coupe was reintroduced in the market. The phase two increased sales by one million and debt was brought down to zero.With his unconventional leadership style and charisma, he began tow in praises from the employees of the company as well as from the industry and the public. Sometimes, people in streets would stop him and wish him success saying, ‘Gambatte [go for it]'. TIME magazine named him the most influential global business executive and more and more Japanese companies were embarking on the gaijin [Foreigner]-Ghosn’s style for attaining maximum benefits in a short time. His colleagues at Nissan were particularly impressed by his dedication towards achievement of targets and his 24/7 work ethics reinforcing the importance of hard work.His devotion towards the revival of the c ompany from problems, for which he was not in any way responsible, encouraged his peers to work hard and contribute towards a common goal. Toshiyuki Shiga who was made in charge of the Nissan’s expansions in China had once remarked, â€Å"He told me to make a clear strategy for Nissan in China, and he gave me two months to do it. †Ã‚  14  While he ensured that the progress was undertaken without holding any individual responsible for the past crisis, he was also at the same time particular about results. | Dominique Thormann, senior vice president, Nissan Europe, said, â€Å"To people who don't accept that performance is what is at stake, he can be ruthless. â€Å"15 Calling his turnaround at Nissan a ‘near death experience', Carlos Ghosn said he had experienced extensive cultural diversities during his tenure at Renault, Nissan, Nissan’s North American business and Samsung motors, a Korean based company acquired by Renault. His management style is wov en around two attributes- ‘value and motivation'. He believed in motivating employees and demanding performance by empowering them. Your employees must be interested in what is going on in the company. Nothing is more inefficient than a boring company. You have to create an interesting environment where people are interested in the story you are creating and want to hear the happy ending†, he said. He was called ‘Ice Breaker' by Daimler Chrysler's Chairman Jurgen E. Schrempp because of his unconventional thinking and implementing western style of management in Japan breaking the prevalent myth in the industry. Carlos Ghosn: The ‘Nissan Magic' Cont†¦The biweekly comic series, ‘The true life of Carlos Ghosn' featured Nissan's CEO Carlos Ghosn, depicting his popularity in the industry as well as the country. Some others called him ‘an ambassador of change', ‘the troubleshooter' and considered him as a role model for all those business exec utives who were seeking solutions to the poor state of their companies in Japan. After the implementation of the Nissan Revival Plan (NRP), within two years, the company recovered from the losses and reported a 10. 2%increase in its revenues and nearly 84%increase in its operating profits .Though the sales had not considerably improved, the cost cuttings contributed towards improving the bottom line. In May 2001, the company reported its largest net profit of $2. 7 billion. Carlos Ghosn was named the ‘Businessman of the year' by Fortune magazine in 2002 and Auto mobile Magazine called him' man of the year' for his contributions to Nissan. Renault increased its stake in Nissan to 44. 4%while Nissan owned 13. 5%of Renault's share capital. However, by 2003,Nissan started experiencing a downward trend in its sales, as the volume of goods that passed out from dealers was dropping in size.Customers regularly complained of quality defects and Nissan’s rank in overall quality ( as per a survey by J. D. PowerAssociates) dropped to 11th in 2004 from6th in 2003. It looked as the rigorous emphasis on the faster execution of the restructuring had resulted in these quality defects while Ghosn assured he would fix them. To counter the situation, in May 2004, he sent a quality control team of 220 engineers to the Nissan plant in Smyrna (Tennessee) and every part of the assembly line went through a detailed scrutiny.Subtle issues like the workers who wore studded jeans and rings causing scratches to the freshly painted cars, etc came to light. Ghosn was amazed at some very obvious ones, which could be rectified at the plant, like defective doors and reading lights etc. Carlos Ghosn had already achieved two of the three goals that were set for NRP, the debt was cleared and profitability was achieved. | | The Nissan 180, an extension of NRP was launched and aimed at additional sales volume of one million annually from 2005, the third objective of NRP. US market was c onsidered to play a key role in achieving the goal of additional one million sales.A new plant was set up in Canton, the first in North America where Nissan was facing challenges from other Japanese automakers, Toyota and Honda. Mean while, Nissan was planning an alliance with Mitsubishi after Daimler Chrysler gave up its plans of partnership with Mitsubishi. The partnership would help Nissan enter the mini car segment while Mitsubishi would be able to reduce cost burden of new product development. The shortage of steel supplies forced Nissan to reduce its production in 2004, affecting production of 15,000 units amounting to $58. 5million of loss in sales.Nissan closed its plants for five days following the shortage of supplies, as steel prices in creased with demand for steel increasing after the economic boom in China. While halting production was considered a sign of mismanagement many felt that Carlos Ghosn's attempt to bring down the number of suppliers as part of NRP, had resu lted in over-reliance on few suppliers . However, Ghosn defended himself saying that the savings achieved during that phase were far more [$9. 7 billion] than the losses incurred due to loss of sales. Renault – The French Automaker Renault was a state owned government enterprise since 1945.It was started as a motorized vehicle assembler in 1898. Renault built trucks, airplane engines and heavy vehicles during the World War II and after the war and with the economic boom, Renault achieved high volume sales with its low cost cars like 4CV, Renault 4 and Renault 5 through the 1970s and 1980s. During early 1980s, Renault expanded into US by acquiring half the shares of American Motor Corporation. However, the deal was unprofitable and the company had to withdraw from the market in 1987. A similar deal failed in Mexico, and with both the deals financed through debts, Renault was left ith huge debts accumulated by the end of 1980s. It reported losses of $3. 5 billion between 1984 a nd 1986. Further, because it was a state owned business, obligations with labour unions led to more costs for the company. When Louis Schweitzer joined Renault in 1986,Renault had accumulated debts to the tune of $9 billion and was in huge losses. Its proposed merger with Sweden based ABVolvo in 1993 failed due to unfavorable French political climate and with Swedish shareholders expressing reservation. The company continued to be in losses till 1996,when Schweitzer brought in Carlos Ghosn as the executive vice president.Under the duo, product quality was improved, outsourcing secondary activities and overheads were reduced along with reduction in workforce. The same time, French government started setting ground for its IPO when Louis Schweitzer discovered that privatization of the company could only save it. In July 1996, the IPO was completed. By 1998,with the midsize model Scenic, Renault was successful in European market and in 1998 alone it made profits of $1. 4 billion from$4 0 billion sales. 16 While Renault became the No. 1 automaker in Europe, to be a global player, it had to expand its operations further.By the end of 1990s, it had a very small presence in Asia and was totally absent in the North American market. After the merger of Daimler and Chrysler in 1998, for Renault, expansions became a requisite. And, Nissan seemed a lucrative opportunity, as an alliance with Nissan could help in easier market expansion for Renault in developing markets. While others including Ford and DaimlerChrysler had earlier attempted a deal with Nissan, they later withdrew keeping in view the huge debt that Nissan held and its culture that was inflexible. | After the alliance, Renault managed to reduce its launching and warranty costs for new product introductions by recruiting managers from Nissan to undertake the launch. At the same time, it sent its employees to Nissan to oversee manufacturing, to achieve cost efficient production. Later Renault acquired Samsung Mot ors in South Korea and Roman automaker, Dacia as part of its international expansion. With the launch of multi purpose vehicles, Laguna II and A van time in 2001 and Espace IV in 2002 , and after its association with Formula One racing between 1992 and 1997, its brand popularity improved.By 2004,Renault held strong foothold in European market and reported a 6. 5%increase in sales by the first half of 2004 and was the fourth largest auto company in the world. It held nearly 11%market share in Western European market in passenger car and light vehicle cars. At the same time, Renault performance in large cars segment was sluggish and was struggling to achieve operating margin of 4%, when the demand for cars in the European market was low. Some of the new launches like the Vel Satis, a tall saloon luxury model, were not very successful in the market. Are launch in the US market was also underway.Renault was facing other challenges along with Nissan and other automakers. Environmental fr iendly cars, which seemed a likely potential opportunity, were costly to manufacture at the price the customers were ready to pay. Renault was planning for expansions in Chinese market and South Korea and other parts of Asia through alliance with Nissan. Next ;gt;;gt; 16]†For Renault, a new chance to take on the world†, www. businessweek. com, November 15th 1999 Carlos Ghosn as CEO of Renault and Nissan By 2010, Nissan and Renault would build their cars using the common building blocks.Ghosn viewed the alliance as â€Å"managing contradiction between synergy and identity†17  and confirmed that while gaining synergies, the individual identity of each brand would be safeguarded. The other major alliances in the industry, the DaimlerChrysler and the GM/Fiat had not proved to be very successful because of improper management of merged assets, trans-atlantic product development and failed attempt in understanding local market; Ghosn confirmed that Nissan's alliance w ith Renault would creatively achieve it. At the same time the alliance would avoid merger and would maintain ‘a spirit of partnership'18  .The alliance would be the fourth largest automobile group in the world. In October 2004, the first car was built using a common platform of Nissan and Renault. Modus, a subcompact minivan of Renault shared its base with Nissan’s Micra saving $500million for Renault every year. After Carlos Ghosn succeeds Schweitzer at Renault's in April 2005, he would also continue as the CEO of Nissan. Carlos Ghosn was affirmative that he would not leave the company unless he finds the right person who would succeed him at Nissan. He stressed on the need for a Japanese as the CEO of Nissan in such a culture sensitive country.While at Nissan, he had transformed himself into a Japanese, adapting to the culture, analysts feared if he would breach the French business etiquettes as he takes up the rein at Renault. 19  Two of the five vice presidents at Renault would retire soon, and Carlos Ghosn was to take up the reigns at both the companies, during such senior level management changes. At the same time, many feared if the sense of urgency brought through NRP would continue at Nissan or will the company slip back to its old habits, when Carlos Ghosn leaves.The pressure was considered to be very high, as an analyst stated, â€Å"He will be less present at Renault than he was at Nissan, and less present at Nissan that he used to be. I believe this challenge will be more difficult. â€Å"20 The alliance had helped both the companies equally, in terms of cost savings from not requiring to construct new plants where the alliance can use common buildings, common platforms etc. This had also helped them enter new markets faster and gain other synergies . The purchasing power had also increased as they ordered and bought components through Renault-Nissan purchasing organization for both the companies at a time. | The alliance had fr om the beginning ensured that the inter-company cultural clashes do not exist, by maintaining individual cultural identities. While a merger had been avoided since the beginning, Carlos Ghosn confirmed that it would be its agenda in future also. Carlos Ghosn remarked that when he takes up the two positions, he would blend the strengths of the people at the companies, the innovation excellence of the French and the dedication towards manufacturing of the Japanese. 21  He affirmed that his tenure at Nissan had allowed him to learn the real essence of successful leaders, and would drive his success in future also.He called himself, ‘not a theorist of citizenship but an expert in multi nationality’. 22 Carlos Ghosn called the three major attributes, ‘Value, Transparency and Performance' as the ones that would determine the competence of any CEO. He believed that they act as standards for leadership in global business, in the light of growing corporate scandals, when the top executives of the companies were increasingly coming under scrutiny. He explained that the actual results that are delivered along with simultaneous value creation to the customers and the other stakeholders through maintaining transparency, reflect an efficient leadership.By communicating every strategy to every person concerned, he maintained that it would facilitate a faster reaction to dynamics in the fiercely competitive global market place. An analyst once called Carlos Ghosn, ‘amanager without borders, polyglot and cosmopolitan'. Talking about his dual roles and the cultural barriers that he will have to face as he moves to Renault while also heading Nissan, Carlos Ghosn said, â€Å"Global is global. In my opinion, this is going to be the story of the twenty-first century.This is what's going to happen in the twenty-first century – you're going to see the emergence of more ‘global' standards, some kind of global references; you're going to see mor e and more of it. But ‘globality' doesn’t mean ‘uniformity. ‘ It doesn't mean that. You’ll still have different cultures, you’ll still have different tastes, and you’ll still have some adaptations to make to different countries, but you'll have some basic things that will be common globally, especially in the economic area. â€Å"23 17]†Renault's alliance with Nissan†, www. economist. om, August 16th 2001 18]Parachkevova, Anna â€Å"CEO outlines Nissan's resurgence†, http://thedartmouth. com, May 12th 2004 19]†Carlos Ghosn- Nissan motor†, www. businessweek. com, January 8th 2000 20]Tierney, Christine â€Å"Leadership, bold moves help Renault save Nissan†, www. detnews. com, October 24th 2003 21]Smith, Duvergne, Nancy â€Å"Nissan Renault alliance faces down few challenges†, http://web. mit. edu, November 18th 2004 22]Abescat, Bruno â€Å"I am an expert of multi nationality†, http://liv res. lexpress. fr 23]†Carlos Ghosn: standing at the global crossing†, op. cit